Futures Before Fungibility: Benchmark Governance and Regulatory Friction in GPU Compute Markets

Abstract

Benchmark design shapes whether a derivatives market forms and how much disruption it can withstand. We develop a participation model of compute derivatives in which benchmark granularity improves exposure matching but divides counterparties, while technological abstraction exchanges vintage mismatch for conversion uncertainty. Eight propositions with proofs establish a critical participation threshold and show that the margin above it is exactly the largest common adverse benefit shock preserving a positive equilibrium. Shared liquidity supports finer benchmarks. Governance expands formation capacity but can favor finer or coarser menus. Strong demand on one side cannot compensate for inadequate counterparty participation. Official records and 165 published rental-index observations establish the institutional setting and segmentation. Analytical proofs and assumedparameter illustrations establish the mechanisms. Benchmark architecture, governance and liquidity integration jointly determine market formation and resilience.

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