Monetary policy expectations, central-bank language, voting authority, and financial markets.
This paper tests whether dispersion in market-implied Federal Open Market Committee outcomes contains information about the long-run component of U.S. equity volatility. For 38 meetings, I construct the crossoutcome variance…
The market impact of the Federal Reserve's dot plot depends on the expectations formed before its release. Using 43 Summary of Economic Projections meetings from September 2015 through June 2026, this paper measures surprise…
Formal voting authority can matter even when it does not visibly change what a central banker says. We exploit the mechanical annual rotation of voting rights among Federal Reserve Bank presidents and ask whether otherwise c…
Yield-curve risk is often assembled in two steps: estimate separate volatilities for Nelson–Siegel factors, then map those volatilities back to individual maturities. The convenient diagonal map silently treats level, slope,…
Does the volatility relevance of central-bank language travel across institutions, measures, and policy regimes? Using a harmonized text-scoring and GARCH-MIDAS pipeline, we study 362 scheduled statements from the Federal Re…
This paper examines whether Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statement language is associated with the long-run component of equity market volatility. We construct a dataset of 89 scheduled post-meeting statements issued…
Central bank communication has evolved from a peripheral policy instrument into its primary transmission mechanism. This survey treats "Fed speak" as a narrative-economic phenomenon, applying Shiller's (2017) framework to br…